Minnesota's Indecent Exposure Crime Gets Clarifications - Sort Of
As we’ve previously discussed in a couple blog posts, the indecent exposure crime has statutory language that is vague and was applied inconsistently as a result. It left too much to interpretation by who was doing the enforcement. Minnesota courts have tried to offer clarification over the years, but much remains to be clarified. The Minnesota Supreme Court just tackled one case that presented a few issues that the Court answered – sort of.
The Supreme Court just issued its decision in State v. Plancarte – a case where the defendant was convicted of indecent exposure for exposing her breasts while walking around a gas station parking lot. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the behavior at issue was not lewd and therefore overturned the conviction. The concurring opinion went a step further in holding – albeit, in dicta (i.e. a non-precedential opinion) – that female breasts were not private parts subject to the indecent exposure crime. A lot to unpack – so let’s dive in.
The Facts
First, we need to understand the basic facts before diving into the court’s analysis of whether the indecent exposure crime applied. The defendant was a female who was reportedly walking around a gas station parking lot with her breasts exposed. A responding officer had interacted with her a couple of times previously that week where she had also exposed her underwear and breasts. On this occasion, she was arrested and charged with both indecent exposure and drug possession (the latter charge likely explains the why behind the former charge). The district court made a critical finding of fact – there was nothing sexual in how the defendant was behaving while her breasts were exposed. She made two comments of note to the officers – “I think Catholic girls do it all the time” and “I’m a stripper.”
Indecent Exposure Crime Analysis
The Court started by analyzing the indecent exposure crime statutory language, which is:
“willfully and lewdly exposes the person’s body, or the private parts thereof.” Minn. Stat. 617.23, subd. 1.
The case ultimately rested on the definition of ‘lewdly.’ Until this case, no clear definition for it existed. And, as the Court determined, there were four possible and reasonable definitions: obscene, indecent, lustful, and misconduct of a sexual nature. As a result, the term was deemed ambiguous, and the Court had to decide which definition applied.
Long story short, the Court ultimately concluded that lewdly, as used in the statute, is defined as ‘conduct of a sexual nature.’ In so holding, the Court also held that exposure of a person’s “body or the private parts thereof” alone is insufficient to be lewd conduct in violation of the indecent exposure crime. These are two significant rulings and provide some clarification on how to apply the indecent exposure crime. Now we know what ‘lewdly’ means in the statute and we also know that exposure alone is not lewd.
Applying these rulings to the facts outlined above, the Supreme Court overturned the defendant’s indecent exposure conviction. Mere exposure of her breasts alone was insufficient for lewd conduct. And, as the trial court noted, there was nothing sexual in nature to the defendant’s conduct. Further, her statements about the ‘Catholic girls’ and being a stripper did not impact the analysis. As the Court pointed out, her subjective intent is not relevant to the objective analysis of whether her conduct was sexual in nature. So, the bottom line was – her breasts were exposed; that’s it. Without more, it is not enough for a conviction for the indecent exposure crime.
Concurring Opinion
While the majority opinion limited its holding to defining ‘lewd’ and applying it to the case, the concurring opinion took it a step further and offered its thoughts on whether female breasts were captured by the statutory language ‘person’s body, or the private parts thereof.’ On initial blush, one would probably lean that, yes, female breasts are either ‘a person’s body’ or ‘private parts.’ But after reading the concurring opinion, a holding to the contrary makes sense as applied to this crime. Let us explain.
First, the term ‘person’s body’ was analyzed. Does it mean the whole body or any part of the body? You would think the latter, but the former is correct. And the reason is quite intuitive. The legislature’s inclusion of ‘or the private parts thereof’ immediately after means that the only reasonable interpretation is that the term ‘person’s body’ means the whole body. Interpreting it to mean ‘any part of the person’s body’ would yield the following absurd result, according to the Court:
“[it] would change the meaning of the statute from “the private parts of a person’s body” to “the private parts of any part of a person’s body.” Because individual body parts do not have their own private parts, this definition is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.”
With this defined, clearly, exposing female breasts is not the equivalent of her entire body. So, that part of the indecent exposure crime statute is not applicable. That leaves just ‘private parts thereof.’ This is where one would likely equate female breasts to private parts. But the concurring opinion explained why that is not the case.
The indecent exposure crime used the term ‘private parts,’ whereas other criminal statutes used the term ‘intimate parts.’ The latter has been defined in two ways in the criminal code: “the genitals, pubic area, or anus of an individual, or if the individual is female, a partially or fully exposed nipple,” Minn. Stat. § 617.261, subd. 7(e), and “the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast of a human being,” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 5. While differently defined, both definitions essentially include the female breast as being an ‘intimate part.’ Then, when looking at the common definitions of ‘private parts,’ they routinely refer to them as a person’s genitalia, which means a person’s reproductive and excretory organs. Female breasts do not fall into this definition, either. The Court also pointed out that, if female breasts were to be considered private parts, it would further the ongoing “stigmatization of female breasts as inherently sexual and reinforce the sexual objectification of women.”
Thus, while the Supreme Court majority opinion did not adopt this interpretation, there is no doubt that this concurring opinion is setting the stage for such a conclusion in the future. So, practically speaking, one could argue that female breasts are not captured within the ‘lewd’ indecent exposure crime at all – even if the exposure is sexual in nature.
Indecent Exposure Crime Moving Forward
The Plancarte opinion gave us a definition of lewd, as applied to a person’s body or private parts thereof. The conduct must be sexual in nature. The crime also requires more than mere exposure. The subjective intent of the defendant is basically irrelevant – though, the State will try to make it relevant when said intent supports its argument. While this holding provided much needed clarification, it is still subject to the whims of the enforcer because there is no through-line on what is or is not sexual in nature, necessarily.
This case also gave us guidance, if you will, on whether female breasts can even be subject to the lewd indecent exposure crime at all. While it’s just non-binding dicta, the concurring opinion surely offers a compelling basis for just such a conclusion. The result – the ‘Free the Nipple’ campaign from a decade-plus ago just got some legal grounding for its support.
As you can see, Minnesota’s indecent exposure crime remains ambiguous. While the Plancarte opinion provided clarification, sort of, the applicability will remain inconsistent and will still be rife with litigation. If you find yourself, or someone you love, facing serious indecent exposure crime charges, you need a Minnesota criminal defense attorney who knows the nuances of the law and how to give you the fight you deserve. The North Star Criminal Defense team is exactly that. Contact us today and we’ll get started right away.